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1IntroductIon
The controversy surrounding the Stop Online 
Piracy Act (SOPA) and the PROTECT Intellectual 
Property Act (PIPA) served both as the latest in a long 
line of conflicts between technology and copyright 
holders and also as an indication of things to come.  
While the need to reconcile the copyright interest of 
content producers with the interests of technological 
developers remains of principal importance, the SOPA/
PIPA protest introduced an increasingly powerful 
element—the interest of content consumers and 
technology users.  In terms of legal implications, the 
rise of the consumers as a force to be reckoned with 
represents a failure in the online intellectual property 
market at best and a reassertion of the fundamentally 
anarchical culture of cyberspace at worst.  To remain 
relevant in the online context, copyright law must 
return to its most basic roots, where its primary purpose 
of serving the public interest aligns closest with the 
needs of the cyberspace community. 
The struggle between copyright and technology 
seems like a tale as old as time, made more pronounced 
by the unique attributes of the Internet.  Ever since 
the Internet emerged as a medium for the fast and 
seemingly unlimited distribution of copyrighted 
works, a war has been brewing between copyright 
and technology.  Copyright owners have tried to 
maintain the same rights and control over their creative 
works that they had outside of the digital world.  
Meanwhile, the developers and users of technology 
create new capabilities and habits that perhaps 
unintentionally, but quite effectively frustrate all efforts 
at traditional copyright enforcement.  Skirmishes flare 
up occasionally—usually when a new technology 
threatens to further reduce the control of copyright 
owners.2  Thus, in a way, the SOPA/PIPA debacle was 
1.  Chao “Chad” Guo is a 2013 J.D. candidate at the American 
University Washington College of Law, where he works as a student 
attorney for the Glushko-Samuelson Intellectual Property Law 
Clinic.  He holds a B.A. double major in English and International 
Relations from the University of Virginia.  Chad would like to thank 
Professor Michael Carroll, Brian Dudley, and Alexandra Sternberg 
for their help on this article.  
2.  See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 
merely the latest incident to break the fragile détente.  
On the other hand, an interesting new 
development occurred when a counteroffensive led by 
online entities successfully repelled the most recent 
copyright incursion into the online world.3  The key 
to the victory lay in the empowering of consumers as 
an effective lobbying force, as many websites directed 
visitors to call or write their Congressmen.4  Faced 
with unexpected pressure from their constituents, many 
lawmakers reconsidered or abandoned their support for 
the legislation.5  Consequently, the SOPA/PIPA bills 
ended up on the congressional backburner.6 
The grassroots effort of the SOPA/PIPA 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 417 (1984) (regarding videocassette recorder 
technology); Am. Broad. Co., Inc., v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 
2d 373, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (detailing a technology that enables 
television watching online); Brian Stelter, A DVR Ad Eraser Causes 
Tremors at TV Upfronts, n.Y. tImes, May 16, 2012, http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/05/17/business/media/dish-networks-hopper-
cuts-ads-and-causes-tremors-at-tv-upfronts.html?pagewanted=all 
(“Some reviewers have already called the feature, named Auto 
Hop, a dream come true for consumers.  But for broadcasters and 
advertisers, it is an attack on an entrenched television business 
model, and it must be strangled, lest it spread.”).  
3.  See Amy Chozick, Tech and Media Elite Are Likely to 
Debate Piracy, n.Y. tImes 
July 9, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/07/10/business/media/tech-and-media-elite-are-likely-to-
debate-piracy.html?_r=0 (“Congress, overwhelmed by the popular 
opposition, quickly backpedaled, leaving the legislation to die.”).
4.  Deborah Netburn, Wikipedia: SOPA protest led 8 million 
to look up reps in Congress, L.A. tImes BLog (Jan. 19, 2012, 
10:42 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2012/01/
wikipedia-sopa-blackout-congressional-representatives.html 
(reporting that “8 million U.S. readers took Wikipedia’s suggestion 
and looked up their congressional reps from the site” while “4.5 
million people had signed [Google’s] petition asking lawmakers to 
reject [SOPA and PIPA]”).
5.  See Paul Tassi, Internet Blackout Causes 18 Senators to 
Flee from PIPA, ForBes.com 
(Jan. 19, 2012, 9:29 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
insertcoin/2012/01/19/internet-blackout-causes-18-senators-to-flee-
from-pipa/ (including a list of Senators who withdrew support for 
the bill).
6.  Stephanie Condon, PIPA, SOPA put on hold in wake of 
protests, cBsnews.com 
(Jan. 20, 2012, 9:41 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
503544_162-57362675-503544/pipa-sopa-put-on-hold-in-wake-
of-protests/ (“Senate and House leaders announced Friday they are 
postponing work on two controversial anti-piracy bills in the wake 
of large online protests that spurred several congressmen to rethink 
the legislation.”).
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protestors also highlights the importance of the law in 
the ongoing conflict.  While copyright holders have 
consistently looked to copyright law for support as 
they advance towards gaining more ground, copyright 
law may just as well serve the purposes of the online 
community in resisting efforts to control the Internet 
and its users.  In other words, the Internet community’s 
apparent belief—that copyright holders’ need to 
be compensated fully7 for the use of their creative 
works online should defer to the interest of a free 
and open Internet—could very well have support in 
legal doctrines.8  These doctrines then could provide 
a way to harmonize intellectual property law with 
online behavior and perhaps provide some measure of 
satisfaction to all parties.
This Article discusses the role of copyright law 
as applied to the Internet environment in light of past 
and current developments involving copyright holders, 
technology developers, and now consumers.  Part I 
provides a brief background on the jurisprudence of 
copyright law as applied to technological developments 
in the entertainment and related industries.  Part II 
examines both statutory and case law that supports 
the separation of copyright’s exclusive rights from 
traditional, direct financial compensation to copyright 
holders.  Part III explores the policy implications of 
altering the compensation scheme of copyright holders 
on the Internet.  Finally, Part IV concludes that the law 
need only serve the public interest, and it is the industry 
that must compromise when faced with a conflict 
between copyright and technology.  
I.  BAckground
The purpose of copyright is explicitly stated in 
the highest law of the land.  Given its progress-oriented 
purpose, it is paradoxical how often copyright struggles 
when faced with new, groundbreaking technology.  
An examination of the jurisprudence of copyright law 
encountering new technologies may help to shed some 
light into this paradoxical relationship. 
 A. The Original Purpose and Subsequent  
 Codifications of Copyright Law
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United 
States Constitution provides: “The Congress shall have 
Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
7.  Compensated “fully” means that copyright holders would 
be compensated under purely market-based conditions, as opposed 
to statutorily determined compensation or no compensation at all.
8.  See infra Part II.
Writings and Discoveries.”9  Other fields of law should 
be so lucky as to have their purpose so explicitly stated 
in the ultimate source of their authority.10
The goal of copyright does not focus so much 
on the interests of the authors and inventors as it does 
on the public interest goal of promoting progress 
of the sciences, which has been interpreted to mean 
knowledge and creativity in general.11  Providing 
financial compensation to authors and inventors is 
merely the means by which creative advancements 
are incentivized, but financial compensation is not 
the end goal itself.12  By that logic, then, in instances 
where the public interest would best be achieved by 
limiting or denying an author or inventor the exclusive 
right to his or her works, the law should and can 
readily support such curtailment.13  The Copyright 
Act already specifically limits the copyright holder’s 
exclusive rights to an enumerated bundle.14  The rights 
granted by copyright law are also limited to a specific 
set.15  These include, among others, the exclusive 
right of reproduction and the exclusive right of public 
performance.16
In addition to the limitation of enumerating 
the rights available to copyright holders, two legal 
doctrines limit these rights even further.  First, the 
constitutional clause itself provides for “limited times” 
during which the author’s right to his or her work is 
exclusive.17  This notion is reflected in the doctrine 
of public domain, by which the author’s exclusive 
9.  u.s. const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
10.  But see William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, 
in new essAYs In the LegAL And PoLItIcAL theorY oF ProPertY 168, 
171–74 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) (surveying three additional 
theories of intellectual property). 
11.  See Infodek, Inc. v. Meredith-Webb Printing Co., Inc., 
830 F. Supp. 614, 621 n.8 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (“[T]he use of the term 
‘science’ relates to copyrights and is generally given its eighteenth 
century meaning of knowledge or learning.”).
12.  When considering who is being incentivized, it is 
important to note that the incentives are not solely for those who 
create copyrighted works, but also extends to those who would 
invest and produce the works.  Producers and investors require 
assurance that the money they put into a creative endeavor will 
yield fruit.  144 cong. rec. H9950 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) 
(statement of Rep. Coble) (“When works are protected by 
copyright, they attract investors who can exploit the work for 
profit.”).  This means that copyright also protects the investment 
interests of persons or entities other than the artists themselves. 
13.  See infra text accompanying notes 14–20. 
14.  17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
15.  Id.
16.  Id. § 106(1), (4). 
17.  u.s. const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have 
Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”) (emphasis 
added).
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property rights in a work are terminated by the simple 
passage of time.18  Once a work enters into the public 
domain, parties other than the author may use or enjoy 
the work however they wish.
Second, copyright law recognizes the doctrine 
of fair use.19  Fair use directly invokes the public 
interest purpose of copyright by denying authors an 
exclusive right to their work when usage by another 
party is perceived to be fair in the eyes of the law.20  For 
both public domain and fair use, the copyright holder 
has no control over his or her original work.  This has 
resulted in numerous interpretations of narratives in 
the public domain21 as well as diverse commentary and 
criticism on certain works through fair use.22
On principle, the Copyright Clause of the 
Constitution and the Copyright Act form the most 
basic understanding of copyright.  The verbiage and 
the legal doctrines created by the texts are clearly 
directed at serving the public interest.  Yet in practice, 
copyright, or at least the perception of copyright, 
has been viewed as serving the interests of certain 
industries at the expense of the larger public.23  The true 
intent of copyright law is often lost in conversations 
18.  17 U.S.C. §§ 301–04 (2006).
19.  Id. § 107.
20.  While fair use is recognized as a defense to copyright 
infringement, there is a school of thought that would deem fair use 
to be a right in and of itself.  Compare Harper & Row Publishers, 
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985) (“The drafters 
resisted pressures from special interest groups to create presumptive 
categories of fair use, but structured the provision as an affirmative 
defense requiring a case-by-case analysis.”), with Peter Jaszi, 
Copyright, Fair Use and Motion Pictures, 3 utAh L. rev. 715, 719 
(2007) (“More recently, the United States Supreme Court has made 
it clear that fair use is one of the mechanisms by which copyright 
recognizes the principle of freedom of expression that is enshrined 
in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: without fair 
use, copyright law could be found unconstitutional as applied to 
expressive activities . . . .”).  In other words, if copyright protection 
is an exception to the right to free speech, and fair use is the 
exception to copyright protection, does not fair use simply restore 
the right to free speech?  See id. at 719.
21.  See the LeAgue oF extrAordInArY gentLemen (20th 
Century Fox 2003) (noting that the movie was based on a film 
adaptation of a comic series that utilizes characters almost entirely 
from the public domain such as Allan Quatermain, Captain Nemo, 
Ishmael, and Tom Sawyer); Trivia for The League of Extraordinary 
Gentlemen (2003), ImdB.com, http://www.imdb.com/title/
tt0311429/trivia (last visited Oct. 20, 2012) (“All of the characters 
except [one] have fallen into the public domain, which means that 
anybody can write about them.”). 
22.  See generally Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 
U.S. 569, app. A, B (1994). 
23.  See Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 
ucLA L. rev. 1057, 1069 (2001) (“The ordinary person doesn’t 
notice, because the ordinary person has become so accustomed to 
the idea that culture is managed—that corporations decide what 
gets released when, and that the law can be used to protect criticism 
when the law is being used to protect property—that the ordinary 
person can’t imagine the world of balance our Framers created.”).
involving the vast amounts of revenue generated by 
the sale of copyrighted works.  Just precisely how this 
contradictory perception came into being involves 
looking into a most curious legal history. 
To their credit, United States courts have long 
recognized the public interest aim of copyright law.  
This purpose is perhaps best articulated by the Second 
Circuit in Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc.,24 a case 
about song parody lyrics published in a magazine.  In 
Berlin, the copyright owners brought suit against Mad 
Magazine for infringing on the copyrighted lyrics of 
twenty-five popular songs.25  While finding that there 
was no infringement, the court also laid out the purpose 
of copyright law quite clearly.  The court elaborated 
that “the financial reward guaranteed to the copyright 
holder is but an incident of this general objective, 
rather than an end in itself.”26  The court then stated, 
“[a]s a result, courts in passing upon particular claims 
of infringement must occasionally subordinate the 
copyright holder’s interest in a maximum financial 
return to the greater public interest in the development 
of art, science and industry.”27  This fluid standard—
balancing the interests of copyright holders with those 
of the public as particular infringement claims arose—
would be put to the test time and again, as the next 
section demonstrates.
 B. Traditional Copyright Versus New  
 Technology
The clear purpose of copyright law 
notwithstanding, numerous fights have emerged and 
presented many opportunities for lawmakers to address 
how copyright applies to emerging technologies.  A 
prominent illustration of such a conflict occurred when 
cable television emerged and threatened the exclusive 
right of transmission of the copyright holders through 
broadcast television.28  The conflict seemingly wrote 
the script for future battles: 1) in the exposition, a 
technology emerges that makes copyrighted content 
more accessible to the public; 2) however, the 
technology renders the current efforts of the copyright 
holder to receive compensation for his or her work 
more difficult, if not impossible; 3) as the action rises, 
the copyright holder looks to the law to exercise some 
measure of control over the new technology so that the 
current copyright enforcement efforts remain effective; 
which in turn leads to 4) the climactic battle in the 
24.  329 F.2d 541 (2nd Cir. 1964).
25.  Id. at 542.
26.  Id. at 543–44.
27.  Id. at 544.
28.  h.r. reP. no. 94-1476, at 88–89 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5703.
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courts for a resolution.   
When cable television first emerged, it allowed 
certain areas to receive broadcast television that had 
previously been unavailable due to poor over-the-
air reception.29  However, the mechanism by which 
cable infrastructure received the broadcast television 
signals and then transmitted the signals to consumers 
implicated one of the enumerated exclusive rights 
of those who held the copyrights to the broadcasted 
content.30  This created a dilemma.  Though the 
broadcasters’ content reached a larger audience through 
cable technology, the broadcasters needed some 
measure of control over the retransmission of their 
content pursuant to copyright law.31  Copyright law 
allows for broadcasters to consent to the retransmission 
of their content in exchange for compensation.32  
However, cable providers argued that having to 
negotiate retransmission consent fees with each 
and every broadcaster would be burdensome and 
inefficient, especially when broadcast signals were free 
over the air.33  
The conflict between television broadcasters 
and cable technology resulted in a compromise—
namely, the statutory licensing scheme that has since 
been applied to several other technologies.34  At a basic 
level, statutory licensing allows for anyone to make 
and distribute reproductions of copyrighted works 
without the consent of the copyright owner as long as 
that person pays a statutorily established royalty to the 
copyright owner.  In addition to cable retransmission, 
statutory licensing has been applied to satellite 
retransmission of broadcast television signals as well as 
29.  See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 
Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 391–92 (1968) (providing some background 
information on an early cable system); h.r. reP. no. 94-1476, at 
88, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5702–03 (“A typical system 
consists of a central antenna which receives and amplifies television 
signals and a network of cables through which the signals are 
transmitted to the receiving sets of individual subscribers.”). 
30.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2006) (granting copyright holders 
the exclusive right of public performance).  Public performance 
has been interpreted to include the transmission and broadcasting 
of television signals.  See David v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, 
Inc., 697 F. Supp. 752, 758–59 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).  However, this 
interpretation was not always the case.  See Teleprompter Corp. v. 
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 408–09 (explaining that 
the regulation was subsequently superseded by statute, which led 
to the statutory licensing scheme in place today); Fortnightly, 392 
U.S. at 400–01.
31.  See Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 391–92.
32.  See 47 U.S.C. § 325(b) (2006).
33.  See h.r. reP. no. 94-1476, at 89, reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5704 (“The Committee recognizes, however, that it 
would be impractical and unduly burdensome to require every cable 
system to negotiate with every copyright owner whose work was 
retransmitted by a cable system.”).
34.  17 U.S.C. §111(c) (2006); see also Id. §§ 114(d)(1), (2). 
retransmission of audio works over Internet radio.35  
A few years later, the emergence of the 
videocassette recorder (VCR) also posed a problem 
to copyright holders in the motion picture industry.  
Videocassette recorders were challenged as copyright 
infringing technology in a case that reached the 
Supreme Court.  In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc.,36 various entertainment studios sued 
the manufacturers of home VCR’s and alleged that use 
of the recorders amounted to copyright infringement 
of commercially sponsored television.37  Universal 
Studios argued that by selling the allegedly infringing 
technology, the manufacturers were liable for 
contributory copyright infringement.38  The Court held 
that the sale of VCR’s did not constitute contributory 
copyright infringement.39  The Sony Court made a point 
to note that copyrights were not designed to provide a 
special private benefit.40  Instead, the Court noted that 
the granting of copyrights is only a means to achieve an 
important public purpose, namely to motivate creative 
activity and to allow public access to the products of 
creative activity.41
After the Sony decision, Congress passed the 
Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA) in 1992.42  Like 
statutory licensing before it, the AHRA codified a 
compromise between copyright holders—the movie 
industry—and technology developers—in this case, 
the producers of VCRs.43  The AHRA created a blank 
media levy that required developers of recording 
devices and blank media to pay royalties to copyright 
holders based on a statutorily defined formula.44  In 
exchange, the developers were granted immunity from 
claims for copyright infringement.45  While the blank 
media levy has very notable limitations,46 the royalty 
system allows for the coexistence of copyrighted works 
alongside technology that perfects making copies of 
such works.47
35.  Currently, while statutory licensing covers transmissions 
via Internet radio, it does not cover the permanent downloading and 
copying of works over the Internet.  See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1).
36.  464 U.S. 417 (1984).
37.  Id. at 417.
38.  Id. at 419.
39.  Id. at 417.
40.  Id. at 429.
41.  Id.
42.  17 U.S.C. ch. 10 (2006).
43.  Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing S. 
1623, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3609.
44.  17 U.S.C. §§ 1003–04 (2006). 
45.  See id. § 1008. 
46.  See Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond 
Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(excluding computer hard drives from the scope of the AHRA). 
47.  Although Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 
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In both instances with cable and recording 
technologies, the law recognized that a compromise, 
a give and take, was preferable to strictly enforcing 
the provisions of the Copyright Act.  Curiously, when 
the Internet and its associated technologies implicate 
copyright law, the law has followed another path, and 
copyright holders have opted to enforce copyright 
protections instead of compromising for mutual 
benefit.  The information sharing capabilities of the 
Internet presented problems the likes of which the 
entertainment industries have never seen.  Not only 
could perfect copies of copyrighted music be created, 
but the copies also could be distributed instantaneously 
to potential consumers worldwide.  The unauthorized 
copying and distributing of copyright works became 
known as piracy.48  Concern over the Internet’s 
effect on copyright led Congress to pass the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in 1998.49  The 
DMCA was meant to strengthen copyright protections 
in the online context.50  However, there were still 
questions that needed answering in the courtroom. 
The online activity of file-sharing earned 
the wrath of the music industry in 2001.51  A circuit 
Inc., had already solidified the legality of videocassette recorders, 
the AHRA allowed for fuller coverage of all audio recording 
technology—and blank media used to facilitating recording—that 
fell within its scope.
48.  The word choice, “piracy,” is both inaccurate and 
unfortunate.  The term is inaccurate because copyright infringement 
is not quite the same as theft—and copyright holders had a difficult 
time convincing the public to perceive it as such. Theft implies that 
the copyright holder is deprived enjoyment of the property after 
the unauthorized copying.  See BLAck’s LAw dIctIonArY (9th ed. 
2009); see also Theft, merrIAm-weBster onLIne dIctIonArY, http://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/theft (last visited Oct. 19, 
2012).  However, this is not the case because only a copy is made 
and the original remains untouched with its owner.  Nor can the 
unauthorized distributor be said to be taking the prospective profits 
of the copyright holder since there is no guarantee that a consumer 
would reliably buy something that is not available for free.  The 
piracy label also proves unfortunate due to the romantic notions 
associated with classical pirates in popular culture, and many so-
called online pirates embraced the nomenclature.  See The Pirate 
Bay: About, thePIrAteBAY.se, https://thepiratebay.se/about (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2012). 
49.  Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing 
H.R. 2281, 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 671.
50.  Id.  The DMCA represents the United States’ 
implementation of the World Intellectual Property Organization’s 
twin treaties meant to address the concerns about copyright in 
the digital age.  Id.  An important provision in the DMCA is its 
safe harbor provision, which provides immunity to online service 
providers from copyright infringement under certain conditions.  
See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
51.  File-sharing presented an interesting case because it was 
not immediately apparent that such behavior implicated one of 
the exclusive rights of copyright holders.  Unlike downloading 
from a website, which is analogous to direct reproduction, 
file-sharing could be viewed as merely the sharing by users of 
copyright-protected songs they already purchased.  But see A&M 
court held in a subsequent case that the uploading 
and downloading of copyrighted works was not fair 
use.  In A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,52 the Ninth 
Circuit examined the activities of the then popular 
online file-sharing service Napster with respect to 
interpersonal transmission of copyrighted works.  The 
Napster court ruled that facilitating the downloading of 
copyrighted music infringed upon the exclusive right 
of reproduction and distribution.53  Furthermore, using 
copyright works in this way does not qualify as fair 
use.54 
The Supreme Court later strengthened the 
copyright holders’ victory over file-sharing.  In MGM 
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,55 the Court unanimously 
held that file-sharing companies could be liable for 
inducing copyright infringement.56  In Grokster, the 
file-sharing companies sought to rely on the Sony 
decision,57 which had held that the mere production 
of technology capable of facilitating copyright 
infringement could not constitute contributory 
infringement if the technology had substantial non-
infringing uses.58  However, the Grokster Court 
distinguished the Sony decision by holding that when 
a company induces infringing behavior through the 
promotion of its technology, it no longer has the 
protection of Sony.59
Despite these victories, copyright holders 
still claim to suffer considerable harm from the 
unauthorized consumption of media on the Internet.60  
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(discussing how direct economic benefit is not required for a finding 
that an allegedly infringing use is commercial in nature). 
52.  239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
53.  Id. at 1014.
54.  Id. at 1019.  After Napster, it is firmly established in legal 
jurisprudence that downloading and file-sharing of copyrighted 
music infringes upon a copyright holder’s rights.  However, could 
such behavior still be permitted?  The question is this: could 
Napster have survived (legally) if it, or Internet service providers, 
had paid statutory royalties to the copyright holders?  The Napster 
court declined to allow Napster to use a compulsory license 
scheme because it could not reconcile Napster’s service with any 
of the enumerated circumstances in copyright law that allowed for 
compulsory licenses.  Id. at 1028.  However, the implication is an 
amendment would be necessary to bring online activities such as 
file-sharing within the purview of statutory licensing.  
55.  545 U.S. 913 (2005).
56.  Id. at 913–14.
57.  Id. at 933.
58.  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417, 417 (1984).
59.  Grokster, 545 U.S. at 935–36.
60.  See Motion Pictures Association of America Industry 
Reports, mPAA.org, http://www.mpaa.org/policy/industry (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2012) (containing a list of industry reports on the 
harms of online piracy and copyright infringement); Recording 
Industry Association of America Piracy Impact Studies, rIAA.com, 
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Most recently, these industries supported SOPA and 
PIPA as the latest push towards tightening enforcement 
of copyright laws.61  Yet the pushback from the online 
community, bolstered by public support, stymied the 
efforts of the copyright holders.62  Perhaps then, in light 
of the apparent failures of these enforcement efforts, 
a statutory compromise may yet provide the proper 
solution. 
II.  stAtutorY soLutIons In the AnALogous   
 sItuAtIons oF cABLe teLevIsIon And dIgItAL  
 AudIo recordIng devIces ProvIde AmPLe  
 suPPort For A comPromIse Between coPYrIght  
 hoLders And Internet Interests
Copyright holders certainly have good cause 
for clinging to the traditional business model of making 
money directly from selling their copyrighted content 
in the marketplace.  This traditional business model has 
worked splendidly for the entertainment industries.63  
Given the highly lucrative nature of the entertainment 
industry, marketplace financial compensation serves 
as a very strong incentive for business as usual.64  
However, from a legal standpoint, no reason exists as to 
why copyright law should concern itself with ensuring 
the traditional business model survives in the Internet 
age.65  
http://www.riaa.com/keystatistics.php?content_selector=research-
report-journal-academic (last visited Oct. 22, 2012).  For 
the purposes of this Article, the harm and losses claimed by 
the entertainment industry are presumed to be accurate and 
unexaggerated.
61.  Cecilia Kang, House introduces Internet piracy bill, 
Post tech (Oct. 26, 2011, 6:12 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/blogs/post-tech/post/house-introduces-internet-piracy-
bill/2011/10/26/gIQA0f5xJM_blog.html (“Hollywood, media firms 
and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce immediately hailed the bill, 
saying the government needs to take a stronger stance to prevent the 
rampant illegal use of online content.”).
62.  See Art Brodsky, The Web Can’t Declare Victory Just Yet—
If Ever, PuB. knowLedge PoL’Y BLog (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.
publicknowledge.org/blog/web-cant-declare-victory-just-yet-if-ever 
(detailing the efforts and effects of the SOPA/PIPA protests).
63.  See generally Domestic Movie Theatrical Market 
Summary 1995 to 2012, the-numBers.com, http://www.the-
numbers.com/market/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2012) (providing figures 
for the movie industry). 
64.  It is debatable whether business as usual has yielded 
any real creativity or has merely resulted in studios churning out 
simplistic product to cater to the widest audience possible.  Courts 
do not make judgments on the artistic merits of creative works, 
nor should they.  Instead, whether financial compensation actually 
stimulates creativity, or in other words, does money actually 
produce true art, is a discussion best left to liberal arts scholars.  
However, there is an argument to be made that genuine artistic 
expression is not and cannot be motivated by financial gain. 
65.  See Berlin v. E.C. Publ’ns, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 543–44  
(2nd Cir. 1964).
A. The Law Does Not Require Market-
Based Compensation to Copyright 
Holders
The text of the Constitution and copyright law 
unquestionably demonstrate that copyright is a limited 
right, conditioned on the principle that it must serve 
the public interest.66  In that sense, copyright more 
closely resembles a privilege than a right.  Accordingly, 
there are important statutory limitations—namely 
public domain and fair use—on the exclusive right of 
copyright holders.67   
Under both public domain and fair use, the 
copyright holder receives no compensation for the 
consumption or use of their copyrighted work.68  
Therefore, these doctrines support the notion that 
financial compensation, although by far the most 
popular means of incentivizing creativity, is not the end 
goal of copyright, but rather a means to an end.69  
The many instances during which an emerging 
technology threatened to upset the established business 
model of entrenched entities demonstrate that, very 
often, the two sides struck a deal and compromised 
to allow the introduction of the technology, while 
ensuring that copyright owners received some measure 
of compensation for the curtailment of their exclusive 
rights.  The emergence of cable technology threatened 
the broadcast industry and led to the compromise of 
statutory licensing.70  Like cable technology, which 
infringed upon the broadcast industry’s exclusive right 
of public performance, the Internet and its content 
distribution technologies infringe upon the music and 
motion picture industries’ right of reproduction.  Also, 
like the numerous broadcasters with which cable 
companies would have had to negotiate retransmission 
consent, the number of musical and motion picture 
copyright holders with which Internet providers71 
66.  See supra Part I. a.; see also U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 
8; 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (enumerating rights); 17 U.S.C. § 107 
(2006) (codifying fair use); 17 U.S.C. §§ 301–04 (2006) (setting the 
limited duration of copyrights).
67.  The statutorily created limitations make a great deal of 
sense when viewing copyright law in its proper context.  Copyright 
law and intellectual property law in general, by their very nature, 
infringe upon one of humanity’s most important freedoms—the 
freedom of speech or expression.  See Jaszi, supra note 20, at 719.
68.  Copyright holders receive no compensation from public 
domain or fair use because they do not have the exclusive rights to 
their works under these two doctrines.  
69.  See Berlin, 329 F.2d at 543–44.
70.  See h.r. reP. no. 94-1476, at 89 (1976), reprinted in 
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5704.
71.  Internet service providers, as the gatekeepers of the 
Internet, are probably the party on whom it makes the most sense 
to place the responsibility of collecting fees for statutory licensing.  
See wILLIAm w. FIsher III, PromIses to keeP 219 (Stanford 
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would have to negotiate separate licensing fees would 
also be astronomical.  Lawmakers recognized that such 
inefficiency justifies the implementation of statutory 
licenses for cable providers.72  Similarly, lawmakers 
could also recognize that requiring Internet service 
providers to negotiate licensing fees for music online 
would be burdensome to the point of inefficiency.73  
Therefore, the framework of a statutory license could 
easily be applied to the online context.74  
Similarly, the advent of digital recording 
technologies led to the compromise now found in the 
statutory language of the Audio Home Recording Act.  
Like digital audio recording devices, which allowed 
consumers to record copyrighted music,75 the Internet 
also greatly facilitates the duplication of copyrighted 
music and movies.  Also, like the developers of 
digital recording technologies who wanted protection 
from copyright infringement suits while being able 
to continue manufacturing their products,76 Internet 
technology developers also would likely desire 
legal assurances that both the development of their 
technology could continue and that they would not be 
made liable for any infringement claims.  Lawmakers 
codified a compromise that exchanged statutorily 
defined royalties for protection from infringement 
suit liability.77  Likewise, lawmakers could also use 
similar statutory terms to allow copyright holders and 
Internet technology developers to come to a similar 
compromise.  
No such compromise has been brokered for 
the Internet, but the established framework from either 
statutory licensing or AHRA blank media royalties78 are 
readily applicable.79  The question becomes whether 
such a solution would resolve the concerns of all the 
University Press 2004).
72.  See h.r. reP. no. 94-1476, at 89, reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5704.
73.  Id. (demonstrating congressional recognition of the burden 
of excessive negotiations).
74.  The exact fee amount would still be a point of negotiation 
between the interested parties, as it was with statutory licensing.  
75.  See Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond 
Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1073–74 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(explaining the “brave new world of Internet music distribution” by 
describing how digital recording technology works).
76.  See H.R. reP. no. 102-873(I), at 24 (1992) (describing the 
exemptions as “critical components” of the legislation).
77.  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1003, 1008 (2006).
78.  The compensation system under the AHRA is far from 
perfect, but imperfect compensation still is legal because copyright 
law does not require financial compensation to be equal to market 
levels.  See discussion supra Section II.A. 
79.  See FIsher, supra note 71, at 202–03; A Better Way 
Forward: Voluntary Collective Licensing of Music File Sharing, 
eFF.org, https://www.eff.org/wp/better-way-forward-voluntary-
collective-licensing-music-file-sharing (last visited Oct. 19, 2012).
parties involved. This includes the copyright holders, 
the developers of Internet and related technologies, and 
now the consumers. 
B. Statutorily Defined Compensation 
Would Resolve the Conflict Between 
Copyright Holders and Internet 
Interests
If the provisions of the new compensation 
scheme mirror those of previous ones, they will address 
many of the problems caused by consumption of 
copyrighted works on the Internet.  Copyright holders 
would be guaranteed a way to receive compensation 
for their works.  Internet service providers would be 
shielded from liability.  In theory,80 all parties should 
take away some measure of satisfaction. 
Theoretically, copyright holders will be able 
to receive steady compensation for producing content 
that goes onto the Internet, though the compensation 
scheme will not necessarily be perfect.  Indeed, they 
would have to gamble all of the revenue currently 
generated through direct sales in the market in hopes 
of recovering the revenue through the new statutorily 
defined compensation system.  Depending on how 
the statutory compensation is set, revenue from the 
new compensation may not satisfactorily cover their 
losses.  However, if piracy truly deprives them of the 
amount of revenue that they claim, perhaps imperfect 
compensation would nevertheless be preferable to the 
current system.  This dynamic is perhaps already the 
generally accepted premise of blank media royalties.81  
Although the compensation received by copyright 
holders through such royalties may not perfectly 
offset the compensation lost through private copying, 
copyright holders certainly prefer getting some money 
to none at all.    
Internet service providers would receive 
protection from infringement liability.  While they 
have not been targeted for contributory infringement 
claims yet,82 they may one day find themselves in those 
crosshairs.  While it is true that the Internet is capable 
of substantial non-infringing uses, under Grokster, 
such a capability would not necessarily protect Internet 
service providers from liability.83  A compromise would 
solidify that protection, and Internet service providers 
would not even pay for it themselves since they 
80.  See infra Part III for the practical implications.
81.  See FIsher, supra note 71, at 86–87.
82.  Online service providers already have been targeted 
for contributory infringement claims.  See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. 
YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 25–26 (2d Cir. 2012).
83.  See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 
935–36 (2005).
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could pass on any costs to the customers.84  Similarly, 
Internet service providers would become immune 
from lawsuits regardless of the degree of knowledge 
they had regarding infringing content, which currently 
has become an increasingly contentious part of the 
DMCA’s safe harbor protections.85
Finally, what would such a compensation 
scheme mean for the piracy problem?  Establishing 
a compensation scheme would not directly solve the 
piracy problem, but it likely would do so indirectly.  
Websites that offer unauthorized downloads and 
transfers of copyrighted content would have no reason 
to shut themselves down initially.  However, once 
copyright owners fully embrace the model of providing 
content for free, which is not really free, the piracy 
websites would no longer be providing a unique 
service.  The competition from legitimate sources of 
content would likely push them out of existence.86  
That is how the solution would work in theory.  
How such a compensation scheme would work in 
practice, if it would work at all, requires an entirely 
different analysis. 
III.  understAndIng the nAture oF ALL   
 Interested PArtIes, PArtIcuLArLY the   
 consumers, In the Internet context Is   
 crucIAL to mAIntAInIng the reLevAncY oF  
 coPYrIght LAw onLIne
Aside from the legal concerns, numerous 
policy concerns need to be addressed to adopt a new 
compensation scheme that would radically alter how 
the entertainment industry operates online.  When 
considering the difficulties, however, it remains 
important to remember what necessitates them—a 
demonstration of consumer desire and the adjustment 
that copyright law must make to continue to serve the 
public interest.  The SOPA/PIPA protests showed that 
the consumers of the Internet and its content cared 
more about ensuring the free and open exchange of 
ideas than they did about eliminating online piracy.
The previous section framed the conflict 
84.  Cable systems and blank media producers operate in 
this fashion by transferring the costs of such statutory fees to their 
customers through their prices. 
85.  See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006); YouTube, 676 F.3d at 30.
86.  Consider the example of the prohibition of alcohol.  See 
u.s. const. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933).  During Prohibition, 
criminal figures amassed great wealth because they were willing to 
provide a service that legitimate business could not.  See Organized 
Crime—American Mafia, LAw LIBrArY—AmerIcAn LAw And LegAL 
InFormAtIon, http://law.jrank.org/pages/11944/Organized-Crime-
American-Mafia.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2012).  After the repeal 
of Prohibition, such criminal elements no longer had a market 
because what was once illegal was now legal.  See id.
largely, if not exclusively, in terms of copyright holders 
versus technology developers.  However, through 
all the conflicts, the consumers have always been an 
interested party.87  What the SOPA/PIPA protest also 
showed was that, properly mobilized, the consumers 
have tremendous power in fighting legislation.88  
Dealing with the newly empowered class of consumers 
requires examining just what to make of the strong 
resistance that consumers have towards copyright 
enforcement online.  On the one hand, this resistance 
may be characterized as market failure.  In that sense, 
the problem is a familiar one, and one that familiar 
solutions could easily address.  On the other hand, 
this resistance may reveal the revolutionary impact 
the Internet has had in shaping culture.  The Internet’s 
anarchical structure and participatory culture may have 
fundamentally altered the way in which the public 
interacts with media and entertainment in the digital 
space.  If that is the case, then the challenge becomes 
finding a solution that will be regarded as legitimate 
both to the Internet constituency and to the original aim 
of copyright law.
 A. Characterizing the Piracy Problem as  
 Market Failure
 Even if the entertainment and media industries 
resist abandoning traditional business models with the 
argument that the new compensation scheme is not 
fair and that it undermines the market,89 the law has an 
answer to those arguments.  There are many instances 
in which the government must institute a regulatory 
scheme to ensure that certain socially desirable ends 
are met.90  More relevantly, the legislative history of 
87.  See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“The monopoly privileges that Congress may 
authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide 
a special private benefit.  Rather, the limited grant is a means by 
which an important public purpose may be achieved.  It is intended 
to . . . allow the public access to the products of [creative] genius 
after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.”).
88.  See Brodsky, supra note 62.
89.  A statutory licensing or royalty scheme need not be 
completely unresponsive to market forces.  For example, royalty 
payments could be made to various artists based on the amount of 
play their audio or video receives.  See Fisher, supra note 71, at 
223–24. See generally Online Measurement, nIeLsen.com, http://
nielsen.com/us/en/measurement/online-measurement.html (last 
visited Nov. 29, 2012).    
90.  The most notable example of a government-imposed 
compensation scheme would be taxes, used to pay for public goods.  
See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural 
and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 
82 coLum. L. rev. 1600, 1610–11 (1982) (discussing the 
compulsory payment for public goods dynamic).  Understandably, 
government regulation of the creative industries would be highly 
undesirable, but it is worth noting that creative industries such as 
television and radio have long been subject to federal regulation.  
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the Copyright Act’s statutory licensing sections has 
provided that the government may step in and impose 
a compensation scheme when there is market failure.91  
The question then becomes: has there been a failure 
in the online market for copyrighted content such as 
music and movies?  
Copyright holders would argue that the market 
has not failed, but merely needs stricter enforcement 
to ensure its function.  However, stricter enforcement 
has rarely been the answer when copyright confronts 
technology, as the examples of statutory licensing 
and blank media royalties have demonstrated.  Nor 
does enforcement appear particularly effective given 
the online piracy problem.  Certainly, if piracy is the 
problem to the extent that the motion picture and 
music industries make it out to be,92 piracy itself may 
be considered to be a market failure in the sense that 
there appears to be a widespread unwillingness to pay 
for copyrighted content in the traditional sense.93  A 
statutorily imposed compensation scheme then very 
well could solve the problem in the same way that taxes 
solve the public goods problem,94 and just as statutory 
licensing cable licensing solved the retransmission 
consent problem for cable and satellite television.
If piracy itself constitutes market failure, then 
the resistance shown by consumers to SOPA/PIPA may 
be characterized as market failure as well.  Perhaps 
consumers resist the imposition of laws to enforce the 
traditional business models because they do not find 
the traditional business models to be worth protection.95 
91.  See H.R. reP. no. 94-1476, at 89 (1976), reprinted in 
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5704.
92.  See discussion supra note 60. 
93.  The entertainment industry seems to believe that the 
unwillingness results from the public’s ignorance that such practices 
are illegal and harmful, as evidenced by their efforts to reeducate 
the public through public service announcements.  Eric Perrott, 
Relatively New Anti-Piracy PSA: Another Analogy Comparison 
of Piracy to Stealing Cars or an Effective Message?, Am. u. 
InteLL. ProP. BrIeF (May 12, 2011, 8:37 AM), http://www.ipbrief.
net/2011/05/14/relatively-new-anti-piracy-psa-another-analogy-
comparison-of-piracy-to-stealing-cars-or-an-effective-message/.  
However, if the public innately or instinctively believes that a 
practice is legal, no amount of reeducation is likely to dissuade 
individuals from continuing that practice.  Again, consider 
the example of Prohibition.  See generally sYLvIA engdAhL, 
Amendments xvIII And xxI: ProhIBItIon And rePeAL (Greenhaven 
2009) (noting that respect for the law greatly diminished during the 
unpopular prohibition of alcohol).  In such instances, the law must 
bend to the will of the people or else risk criminalizing a substantial 
portion of the public who had no real intention to violate the law.  
94.  See Gordon, supra note 90, at 1610–11.
95.  See YochAI BenkLer, the weALth oF networks 462 (Yale 
Press 2006) (“Ubiquitous low-cost processors, storage media, 
and networked connectivity have made it practically feasible for 
individuals, alone and in cooperation with others, to create and 
exchange information, knowledge, and culture in patterns of social 
reciprocity, redistribution, and sharing, rather than proprietary, 
Perhaps the old business models are no longer 
supportable.96  The introduction of a new compensation 
scheme may be precisely what is needed then to serve 
the interests of all parties.
 B. Legitimizing the Law in the Culture of  
 Cyberspace
A far larger problem would be the highly 
likely scenario that consumers, and the technology 
developers,97 reject any kind of statutorily mandated 
payment to copyright holders.98  In other words, 
what do the consumers really get out of such a new 
statutory compensation arrangement?  Theoretically, 
consumers would receive the ability to do what they 
have wanted to do all along—that is, to consume and 
use copyrighted works freely.  That is not to say that 
copying and distributing songs over the Internet would 
suddenly become legalized.99  However, being that it 
no longer presents a problem to copyright holders, the 
threat of legal action disappears to the point where 
it becomes de facto legal.  The problem with this 
theoretical benefit is that consumers may do whatever 
they desire, no matter what the law is.    
To look at it another way, the piracy problem 
and the consumer resistance to laws aimed at greater 
suppression of piracy may indicate that there is a 
fundamental disconnect between the consumers 
and producers of copyrighted works on the Internet.  
Furthermore, the protests demonstrate that even the 
lawmakers themselves severely misread the reactions 
of the people.  The consumers—the users of the 
Internet—may have no desire to accommodate either 
copyright holders or the law in an effort to maintain 
any semblance of the current framework of intellectual 
property.100
market-based production.”).
96.  See id. at 468. 
97.  The consumers play a major role in whether Internet 
service providers would accept the new compensation scheme.  The 
incentive for Internet service providers to pay these royalties lies in 
the potential immunity from litigation.  However, providers would 
only be willing to pay if consumers were willing to bear the added 
costs.   
98.  See Mike Masnick, Why A Music Tax Is A Bad Idea, 
techdIrt (Dec. 9, 2008, 11:40 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20081209/0144083060.shtml.  
99.  This sentiment is an important distinction because even 
the Audio Home Recording Act’s provision shields developers of 
recording technology, not users, just as the DMCA shields online 
service providers and not end users.  Compare 17 U.S.C. § 1008 
(2006), with id. § 512.
100.  See generally John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the 
Independence of Cyberspace, eFF.org (last visited Oct. 19, 2012), 
https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html; Josh Levy, 
After SOPA: A Declaration of Internet Freedom, huFFIngtonPost.
com (July 1, 2012, 10:32 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/josh-
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In light of this, the equally possible notion 
is perhaps the Internet creates a jurisdiction where 
traditional copyright simply cannot be enforced to 
the extent that it is enforced outside of cyberspace.101  
Might the Internet be governed by a different set of 
laws or rules than the physical world?102  Is the Internet 
every bit the haven for lawless rogues that the high 
seas were for pirates during the golden age of piracy?103 
Perhaps, then, the lawless pirates understand more 
about cyberspace than the law and lawmakers. 
Alternatively, framed another way, the culture 
of the Internet, and its empowering effect on the 
individual, could offer another explanation for the 
power shift whereby consumers want to take control 
of the content they support and consume.  The Internet 
and social media have conditioned users to be more 
vocal and participatory.104  No longer will consumers 
sit idly by and allow the industries they support to 
remain callous to their desires about how they want 
to consume media.105  This shift is not necessarily a 
levy/after-sopa-a-declaration_b_1641959.html.
101.  See mAdhAvI sunder, From goods to the good LIFe 29 
(Yale University Press 2012) (stating that “[m]eanwhile, rapid-fire 
technological advances and new forms of creative output, from 
YouTube and MySpace to the advent of open-source collaborative 
networks, garage bands, remix culture, and the World Wide 
Web itself, undermine utilitarian intellectual property law’s very 
premise: that intellectual property rights are necessary to incentivize 
creation.”  This suggests that technological advances may even 
undermine the incentive based purpose of intellectual property 
law.). 
102.  See generally Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: 
What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 hArv. L. rev. 501 (1999). 
103.  The fictional Captain Jack Sparrow, from Disney’s 
PIrAtes oF the cArIBBeAn franchise, espouses that the only rules 
that matter are defined solely by the capabilities of any individual.  
PIrAtes oF the cArIBBeAn: the curse oF the BLAck PeArL (Walt 
Disney Studios 2003) (“The only rules that really matter are these: 
what a man can do and what a man can’t do.”).  
104.  See sunder, supra note 101, at 35 (“Changing 
technologies and social mores have made culture more interactive 
and participatory.”).  Might the exclusionary nature of intellectual 
property protection then be fundamentally at odds with the 
evolution of an increasingly inclusionary culture?  Some theorists 
would argue that the Internet almost demands a shift from 
proprietary models of production towards nonproprietary ones.  See 
BenkLer, supra note 95, at 462. 
105.  See BenkLer, supra note 95, at 467 (“Some of the 
time that used to be devoted to passive reception of standardized 
finished goods through a television is now reoriented towards 
communicating and making together with others, in both tightly and 
loosely knit social relations.”).  Furthermore, despite their role as 
the audience for content, consumers are often an afterthought when 
players in the entertainment industry fight over money, as evidenced 
by the dropping of certain television networks and programs during 
carriage disputes between television programmers and distributors.  
See Brian Stelter, DirecTV-Viacom Dispute Turns Into Blackout 
Reality, medIA decoder—nYtImes.com (July 11, 2012, 10:19 AM), 
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/11/viacom-directv-
standoff-causes-channel-blackout-in-20-million-households/.  
Consumers may now be able to make their displeasure known in 
bad thing and may simply represent the next step in 
cultural evolution.  Evolution requires adaptation.  The 
entertainment industry simply needs to adapt and to 
bend more to the will of their consumers, or customers.  
This should be nothing new to the industry, which like 
any business, ought to obey the age-old maxim that the 
customer is always right.106 
Throughout all of this, the law need only do 
one thing to remain legitimate: continue to promote 
the public interest.  And the public has spoken that 
they have more interest in keeping the Internet free of 
controls and regulations if such control means even 
the potential of stifling ideas and innovation online.  
Insomuch as the free expression of ideas is every bit 
as crucial to the progress of the sciences and the useful 
arts, if not more so than financial incentives, copyright 
law would continue to fulfill its original, constitutional 
mandate even if it no longer facilitated traditional 
market-based compensation to copyright holders.
Iv.  concLusIon
Copyright does not function merely to grant 
copyright holders exclusive rights to their works, 
but rather the law also must promote progress in the 
creative fields.  Copyright is not a tool for maintaining 
control of copyrighted works as a means to preserve 
business models for maximizing profits from creative 
works.  It merely provides incentives that will promote 
creative expression.  The incentives—financial 
compensation—are the means, not the ends towards 
which copyright law strives to achieve.  Understanding 
this fundamental principle of copyright law will be 
crucial to working out a compromise, a peace accord, 
of sorts between copyright holders and the online 
community—including both technology developers and 
consumers.  
The music and movie industries are only a 
couple of the many industries that must contemplate 
how to adapt to online distribution of their products.  
Books may soon have to deal with the same problem 
as electronic books become the norm.  Finally, as video 
drives the increase in broadband technology, television 
will soon migrate online as well.  While the natural 
tendency may be to hold onto the business models that 
have worked offline, the nature of the Internet may 
ultimately frustrate those efforts.  Instead, all parties 
involved would be better served to look forward and 
implement a system that better serves the interests of 
much louder ways than in the past.  
106.  The industry already cares deeply about what consumers 
want.  It needs only now to pay more attention to how the 
consumers want to view and use that content.
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the consumers, consisting of the greater public who 
use the Internet more and more with each passing day.  
Considering that the purpose of copyright law also 
functions to promote the interests of the public, there 
is no reason why copyright should not also change to 
accommodate the demands of the Internet community.
